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Civil Rights and Constitutional Law
By Alfred L. Evans, Jr.*

During the course of 1976, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
rendered approximately 125 opinions in cases dealing with the myriad
ways in which the Constitution of the United States affects the civil relationships between citizens and their government and between each other.
In view of the impossibility of going beyond a rather pointless two or three
sentences per case, should it be attempted to cover all or even the bulk of
these cases, I have once again selected but a few of those areas in which
the Court has acted for a somewhat more detailed analysis.
The first area selected, "The Constitution and Minors," includes a consideration of five cases decided by the Fifth Circuit in connection with the
extent and degree to which constitutional rights that apply to adults also
apply to minors - both inside and outside of the "school" setting. Since
the area is one whose unfolding is both of recent vintage and highly incomplete, examination of the Fifth Circuit's 1976 efforts would be facilitated
by a brief review of some of the landmark decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court as well as of the treatment accorded to "minors' rights" in other
jurisdictions. I hope this will place the Fifth Circuit's 1976 decisions in a
somewhat clearer perspective than would be the case were we to confine
our review strictly to the decisions of this circuit during 1976.
Following our venture into the unsettled and uncertain area of "minors'
rights," we shall consider a number of the Fifth Circuit's 1976 decisions
(along with a few recent Supreme Court decisions) under four separate but
related topics. All relate to discrimination based upon a person's race, sex,
religion and the like. These topics deal with: (1) racial discrimination and
the public schools, (2) racial discrimination in connection with political
appointments, (3) racial and religious discrimination by a private club
(and the degree of state involvement necessary to trigger the Fourteenth
Amendment), and (4) "Title VII." The article concludes with a few brief
comments upon the Fifth Circuit's decisions in four or five miscellaneous
areas.
* Senior Assistant Attorney General, Georgia Law Department, Atlanta, Georgia. A.B.,
College of William and Mary (1950); J.D., University of Virginia (1956). Member of the Bars
of Georgia and Virginia.
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THE CONSTITUTION AND MINORS

ParentalRights
The earlier cases about children and the Constitution did not really
involve minors' rights as much as they did parental rights. These decisions
concerned themselves with the protection of these parental rights against
unwarranted intrusions by government. In the leading case of Meyer v.
Nebraska,' for example, the Supreme Court was faced with an attempt by
Nebraska to outlaw foreign-language instruction in public, private and
parochial schools prior to the eighth grade. Nebraska, along with a considerable number of other states during the period following the First World
War, had become concerned about the fact that many foreign-born persons
were educating their children in foreign-language schools. It was thought
that the result might be a large number of native-born citizens whose
mother tongue, sympathies and ideals would remain those of the old country rather than the new. The rationale of such legislation, based upon
recognition of the obvious fact that one is hard put not to think, analyze,
philosophize and dream in his mother tongue, was that it was within the
police power of the state to advance the cause of enlightened American
citizenship by attempting to insure that children brought up in this country were educated in its language, philosophy, ideals and dreams.2 The few
state supreme courts to pass upon the constitutionality of such legislation
before Meyer had all upheld the legislation on the ground that it was a
reasonable exercise of the state's police power in connection with the education of its youth.3 The Supreme Court of the United States, however,
thought otherwise. Although the Court in Meyer recognized that the purpose of the legislation was easy to understand, it held that the means
chosen constituted too great an intrusion upon parental liberty to stand.,
Recognizing that the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment had not been precisely defined, the Court nonetheless concluded that it "without doubt" extended to the right of an
individual "to marry, establish a home and bring up children," and that
it was "the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life." 5
Two years later, an attempt of government to intrude even more harshly
upon parental rights met a like fate in Pierce v. Society of Sisters.6 Oregon
1. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
2. Id. at 393-394, 397-398. See also State v. Bartels, 191 Iowa 1060, 181 N.W. 508, 531
(1921).
3. See Pohl v. State, 102 Ohio St. 474, 132 N.E. 20 (1921); State v. Bartels, 191 Iowa 1060,
181 N.W. 508, 531 (1921); Nebraska Dist. of Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. McKelvie, 108
Neb. 448, 187 N.W. 927 (1922).
4. 262 U.S. at 401-402.
5. Id. at 399-400 (emphasis added).
6. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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contended that a state's right to enact and enforce compulsory-attendance
laws carried with it the right to insist upon attendance in public schools,
as opposed to private and parochial schools. The state believed that it
could in this manner avoid the social and religious divisiveness which it
perceived would result from the separation of children along religious lines
during the formative years of their education and lives.7 The Supreme
Court concluded that under its decision in Meyer, Oregon's legislation
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct
the upbringing and education of children under their control . . . . The
fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union
repose excluded any general power of the State to standardize its children
by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child
is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct
his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations.'
Of all the Supreme Court decisions regarding the high priority accorded
to a parent's "liberty" to direct and control his child's upbringing and
education in the face of governmental interference for purposes of
"equality," "uniformity," "ending divisiveness" and the like, perhaps the
most magnificent language seen is that contained in Board of Education
v. Barnett? At issue was a West Virginia statute making the Pledge of
Allegiance and a flag salute obligatory in the public schools. A number of
parents who were Jehovah's Witnesses, faced with prosecution for instructing their children, on religious grounds, not to participate, brought suit
both in their own right and on behalf of their children to restrain enforcement of the law as it was applied to Jehovah's Witnesses. Affirming the
district court's grant of the injunction, the Court said:
Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment in support of some end
thought essential to their time and country have been waged by many
good as well as by evil men. Nationalism is a relatively recent phenomenon but at other times and places the ends have been racial or territorial
security, support for a dynasty or regime, and particular plans for saving
souls. As first and moderate methods to attain unity have failed, those
bent on its accomplishment must resort to an ever-increasing severity. As
governmental pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife becomes
more bitter as to whose unity it shall be. Probably no deeper division of
our people could proceed from any provocation than from finding it neces7. It is interesting to note that this 1924 view of the State of Oregon is rather similar to
the reported views of a number of members of the Labour Party in England today. Their
avowed purpose in seeking to eliminate the nation's prestigious private schools is to end the
social divisiveness of class which these world-renowned schools are perceived to engender.
8. 268 U.S. at 534-535.
9. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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sary to choose what doctrine and whose program public education officials
shall compel youth to unite in embracing. Ultimate futility of such attempts to compel coherence is the lesson of every such effort from the
Roman drive to stamp out Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity,
the Inquisition as a means to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian
exiles as a means to Russian unity, down to the fast failing efforts of our
present totalitarian enemies. Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.
It seems trite but necessary to say that the First Amendment to our
Constitution was designed to avoid these ends by avoiding these beginnings.10
The high level of protection which the Court has accorded to the liberty
of parents to direct their children's upbringing and education in Meyers,
Pierce v. Society of Sisters and Barnett remains well secured by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments today. This can be seen in the recent decision of Wisconsin v. Yoder." Amish parents, opposed for religious reasons
to the education of their children beyond the eighth grade, had been prosecuted and convicted under Wisconsin's compulsory-attendance law. Because of the Amish way of life and the manner in which their religion
prevades their agrarian communities, the First-Amendment balancing of
the right of the Amish parents to control the religious education and upbringing of their children against the state's interest in universal education
was resolved in favor of the parents. The Supreme Court referred to Pierce
v. Society of Sisters as authority for the great value which society accords
to "the values of parental direction of the religious upbringing and education of their children in their early and formative years."' 2
This is not to say, on the other hand, that the state's interest in how
children are reared invariably must fall by the wayside whenever they
come into conflict with parental desires. In Prince v. Massachusetts,3 for
example, a Jehovah's Witness ran afoul of Massachusetts' child labor laws
when a nine-year-old over whom she had custody sold "The Watchtower"
on the public streets. This time the parental attack upon state control
under the freedom of religion guarantee of the First Amendment and the
substantive Due Process protection of parental rights under the Fourteenth
did not prevail. The Court said once again that accommodation between
parental rights in connection with household and child-rearing authority
and the state's interest in the general welfare of children required a
"balancing" of these sometimes conflicting interests:
10. Id. at 640-641.
11. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
12. Id. at 213-214.
13. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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[N]either rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting to guard the general interest in a youth's well being, the state,
as parens patriae may restrict the parent's control by requiring school
attendance, regulating or prohibiting child labor and in other ways. Its
authority is not nullified merely because the parent grounds his claim to
control the child's course of conduct on religion or conscience. . . . [Tihe
state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's welfare."
In answer to the argument that the Massachusetts legislation would concededly be unconstitutional if applied to the actions of adults on public
streets, the Court observed that the mere fact that a state could not prohibit a specified activity by adults did not mean that it couldn't prohibit
that activity by children. "The state's authority over children's activities
is broader than over like actions of adults," the Court said. "This is partic5
ularly true of public activities and in matters of employment."'
Minors' Rights
Moving from the more settled concept of parental rights and authority
to the nature, extent and degree of those constitutional rights (clouded and
diluted though they might be) of an unemancipated minor, we find that
the bulk of the law's develoment has taken place only within the past ten
years or so.'" In Kent v. United States,'7 the Supreme Court, perhaps for
the first time, dealt with minors' rights in connection with legislation expressly designed to deal with juvenile problems. Invalidating an order of a
juvenile court which had waived its own statutory jurisdiction over a 16year-old and remitted him to the U.S. District Court for criminal prosecution, the Court held that the fact that the government was functioning
under juvenile legislation as parens patriae in a civil proceeding rather
14. 321 U.s. at 166-167.
15. Id. at 168. Justice Jackson, joined in dissent by Justices Roberts and Frankfurter,
criticized the majority's view that "age" could be used to cut across a true exercise of religion
and auxiliary secular activity. Id. at 178. The other dissent, by Justice Murphy, was predicated upon the view that the indirect restraint which the statute in question was imposing
upon the free exercise by a minor of his religious convictions "through the parents and
guardians" should not be allowed in the absence of some "grave and immediate danger" to
the state or to the health, morals or welfare of the child. Id. at 172-174.
16. This development was to some extent presaged by Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948),
in which the murder conviction of a 15-year-old boy was overturned on due-process grounds.
An alleged "confession" following five hours of interrogation by relays of police officials
between midnight and 5 a.m., while the boy was without the aid of counsel, was more than
the Supreme Court could swallow. The Court said this sort of conduct would concern it even
were the suspect an adult, since "neither man nor child can be allowed to stand condemned
by methods which flout constitutional requirements of due process of law." Certainly age was
a factor to be considered-in the suspect's favor-when it came to withstanding a police
inquisition of this nature, the Court said.
17. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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than as a prosecutor in a criminal proceeding did not give it a license for
procedural arbitrariness. While juvenile-court hearings need not conform
with all of the requirements of a criminal trial, the Court said, juvenile
court hearings must measure up to "the essentials of due process and fair
treatment." 8
The big breakthrough respecting the constitutional rights of minors in
juvenile-court proceedings came fourteen months later in the landmark
case of In re Gault." The Court for the first time spelled out some of the
"essentials of due process and fair treatment." Argument over labels "civil" as opposed to "criminal" proceedings - was unrealistic, the Court
said, when it was freely conceded that a juvenile proceeding which adjudicated "delinquency" could lead to a "deprivation of liberty" by incarceration just as surely as a criminal proceeding. The Court held that "due
process" in juvenile proceedings embraced such things as adequate and
timely notice in writing to the child and his parents of the specific charge
against him or of the matter to be considered at the juvenile court hearing;
the right to counsel and, if the juvenile were unable to afford counsel, to
court-appointed counsel; and the usual criminal constitutional protections
regarding self-incrimination, confrontation, and the right of crossexamination. In reaching this result, the Court, upon review of such cases
as Haley and Kent, pointed out that "while these cases relate only to
restricted aspects of the subject, they unmistakably indicate that whatever
may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the
Bill of Rights is for adults alone." 20 Subsequent decisions of the Court held
that the criminal standard of proof, "beyond a reasonable doubt," rather
than the civil standard, "preponderance of the evidence," applied to
juvenile-delinquency proceedings when incarceration might result,2 ' but
that trial by jury is not among the "essentials of due process" required in
22
such proceedings.
This application of the due-process protections of our Constitution to
governmental "punishment" of children, whether it is labeled "civil" or
"criminal," has been carried over from delinquency proceedings in juvenile
courts to other governmental activities affecting minors. In Goss v. Lopez, 2
for example, the Court held that public school authorities suspending a
student for even a brief period of time should provide for at least some
rudimentary hearing before, or in extreme situations shortly after, the
18. Id. at 562.
19. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
20. Id. at 13.
21. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). The Court once again listened to and rejected the
argument that delinquency hearings under juvenile acts do not require these constitutional
safeguards because they are "civil," not "criminal," proceedings-designed to "save," not
"punish," the child. Id. at 365-366.
22. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
23. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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suspension. The Court indicated that for longer suspension a more formal
procedure might be required by the Due Process Clause."4
In other areas, the constitutional rights of minors are much less settled.
In Ginsberg v. New York,', the Court upheld the conviction of a stationery
and luncheonette store operator who, in violation of New York's penal
code, sold a "girlie" magazine to a 16-year-old. The magazines were not
"obscene" for adults, and the legislation in question did not prohibit the
store operator from stocking the magazines and selling them to persons 17
years of age or older. Rejecting the argument that it was not permissible
for New York to draw a line at age 17 respecting the sex-related but not
obscene magazines, the Court said: "That the State has the power to make
that adjustment seems clear, for we have recognized that even where there
is an invasion of protected freedoms 'the power of the state to control the
conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over
adults.""'2
This dilution of the constitutional rights of children has been noted and
applied by lower federal courts as well as by state courts in varied situations. In Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, for example, a curfew ordinance was attacked by a mother both on her own behalf and on behalf of
her 12-year-old son. The ordinance did not permit the boy to be on the
streets of the Borough unaccompanied by a parent or a parentally authorized adult or not in accord with some other specified exception after 10:30
p.m. and before 6 a.m. The district court, while noting that the Supreme
Court had recognized that minors are "persons" under the Constitution
and possess fundamental rights which the state must respect, also referred
to the fact that the Court had not yet "articulated the special factors that
determine how existing frameworks for analyzing the rights of adults are
applied to minors.""8 The district court observed that even with respect to
First-Amendment guarantees, for which the te Deums of constitutional law
are apt to ring at their loudest, the rights of minors have been declared by
the Supreme Court not to be co-extensive with those of adults. The district
court concluded that while the right of locomotion is a well recognized dueprocess right, it in that case weighed less than the Borough's interest in
the welfare of minors, against which it had to be balanced. The curfew was
consequently held not to violate the First-Amendment or FourteenthAmendment rights of either the mother or her son. Similarly, in holding
that neither the Fourth Amendment nor the "exclusionary rule" was of24. Id. at 584. The Fifth Circuit had some fourteen years earlier held that a due-process
hearing was necessary in school expulsion cases based on disciplinary grounds. Dixon v.
Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
25. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
26. Id. at 638.
27. 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976).
28. 401 F. Supp. at 1253.
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fended by searches of students by school officials without "probable
cause," the Supreme Court of Georgia has noted that the constitutional
rights accorded minor students by the U.S. Supreme Court are "a dilute
version of those accorded adults."' 2' Even if some infringement upon the
outer bounds of the Fourth Amendment may exist, the Georgia Supreme
Court said, it must be balanced against the school discipline which is
required if schools and school administrators are to perform their proper
functions.
As the law continues to unfold, it may reasonably be expected that the
degree of "dilution" of a minor's constitutional rights will vary according
to the situation and specific nature of the right asserted. The Supreme
Court has, for example, already made it quite clear that in cases of the nondisruptive expression of political views or sentiment, a minor student's
level of protection is probably little if anything less than that enjoyed by
an adult. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District,31 school officials had attempted to prohibit three students' wearing black armbands to protest the war in Vietnam. The students had not
in any way disrupted school operations. The Court said:
First Amendment rights, applied in the light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It
can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their
constitu3
tional rights of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. '
The Court held that the students' freedom of speech outweighed the need
for affirming the comprehensive authority of the states and of school officials to prescribe and control conduct within the schools. In the words of
the Court:
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students. Students in school as well as out of school are "persons" under our
Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State
must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the
32
State.
Certainly one of the most sensitive and perhaps politically explosive
aspects of the developing law of the constitutional rights of minors is the
question of constitutional rights of the minor in opposition to parental
rights. In his dissent in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 3 Justice Douglas expressed the
29. State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039 (1975).
30. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
31. Id. at 506. The Fifth Circuit earlier had used a "material and substantial interference"
test in connection with student "speech" and "expression" in Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d
744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
32. Id. at 511.
33. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See the text accompanying notes 11 and 12, supra, for a discussion
of this case.
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following viewpoint on the Amish view of compulsory education beyond
the eighth grade:
I disagree with the Court's conclusion that the matter is within the dispensation of parents alone. The Court's analysis assumes that the only interests at stake in the case are those of the Amish parents on the one hand,
and those of the State on the other. The difficulty with this approach is
that . . .the parents are seeking to vindicate not only their own free

exercise claims, but also those of their high-school-age children.
If parents in this case are allowed a religious exemption, the inevitable
effect is to impose the parents' notions of religious duty upon their children. Where the child is mature enough to express potentially conflicting
desires, it would be an invasion of the child's rights to permit such an
imposition without canvassing his views.
This issue has never been squarely presented before today14
It would have been somewhat surprising for the majority to have allowed
this view to pass uncommented upon when our history and tradition have
so long viewed family integrity - a concept which would seem to presuppose parental control - as one of the highest values of our civilization. The
not unanticipated rejoinder of the majority was that the notion of the
existence of a minor's constitutional rights in opposition to parental authority
would, of course, call into question traditional concepts of parental control
over the religious upbringing and education of their minor children recognized in the Court's past decisions. It is clear that such an intrusion by a
State into family decisions in the area of religious training would give rise
to grave questions of religious freedom comparably to those raised here
and those presented in Pierce v. Society of Sisters . .

.

.On this record

we neither reach nor decide those issues.a
The issue and all that is at stake remains undecided. Even earlier, in
Rowan v. United States Post Office,3 1 Justice Douglas, along with Justice
Brennan, had indicated that the age of the minor might be significant.
While agreeing with the majority that a federal statute could constitutionally permit an addressee to require a mailer to remove his own name from
its mailing lists, they questioned the purported reach of the statute to an
addressee's request to the Postmaster General to include within the prohibitory order "the names of any of his minor children who have not attained
34. Id. at 241-243.
35. Id. at 231-232.
36. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
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their nineteenth birthday, and who reside with the addressee." 7 The two
justices were concerned over the fact that, under the majority's rationale,
"the possibility exists that parents could prevent their children, even if
they are 18 years old, from receiving political, religious or other materials
that the parents find offensive." 8 Both justices indicated that it was their
view that the statute, if applied to prevent children "in their late teens"
from an opportunity to receive such materials, would have constitutional
difficulties.3
Probably the most significant enlargement of the constitutional rights
of a minor in opposition to parental authority is in the emotional area of
the killing of unborn children. While the initial abortion decision of the
Supreme Court, Roe v. Wade, '" expressly reserved the question of whether
parental permission could be required when the pregnant woman is an
unemancipated minor," the answer was not long in coming. In Poe v.
Gerstein,2 the Fifth Circuit held that the "fundamental right" of a woman
to an abortion, which the Supreme Court enunciated in Roe v. Wade,
applied to minors as well as adults. Although parents have considerable
authority over their children, there was no "compelling reason" for the
state's statutory support of this parental authority when it came to their
daughters' abortions. To the court's way of thinking, the statutory result
would be that "parents would be able to overcome their daughter's fundamental rights for insubstantial personal reasons of their own."' 3 This conclusion was ratified by the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthoodof Missouri v. Danforth." The Court observed: "Constitutional rights do not
mature and come into being magically only when one attains the statedefined age of majority. Minors as well as adults, are protected by the
Constitution and possess constitutional rights."'" The Court held that
parental-consent prerequisites of Missouri's abortion legislation were
37. Id. at 741.

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

41. Id. at 165 n. 67.
42. 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd, U.S. -,
96 S.Ct. 3202, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1205
(1976).
43. 517 F.2d at 793. The Court's unspoken value judgment, of course, is that the parent's
so-called "insubstantial personal reasons" (perhaps so "insubstantial" as viewing the "legal"
extermination of unwanted children today as being little different morally from the extermi-

nation of unwanted ethnic groups in such places as Dachau and Belsen 35 years ago) is not
entitled to any weight in comparison to the Supreme Court's "constitutional determination"
that the ending of life (life which is now made to sound less than human by calling it "fetal
tissue," just as the life terminations 35 years ago were perhaps made somewhat more palata
ble to those then performing the terminal operations by classifying the victims as less than
human "untermensch") is not only permissible but a "fundamental right."
44.
- U.S.
, 96 S. Ct. 2831, 49 L. Ed. 2d 788 (1976).
45. 96 S.Ct. at -, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 808.
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overly broad. While disclaiming an intention to suggest that any minor,
regardless of age or maturity, could give effective consent to the termination of her pregnancy, the Court concluded that, in general, any independent interest the parent might have in the termination of the minor daughter's pregnancy "is no more weighty than the right of privacy of the competent minor mature enough to have become pregnant."' 6 Thus, in the eyes
of the justices the defect of the Missouri legislation was that it imposed a
special consent provision, exercisable by a person other than the pregnant
woman and her physician, as a prerequisite to termination of the unborn
child's life, and did so without "sufficient justification.' 7 Relying upon
that view expressed in Danforth, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed
the Fifth Circuit's decision in Poe v. Gerstein.'8
The Fifth Circuit's 1976 Contributions
Against this background the Fifth Circuit's 1976 contributions to the
development of law regarding the constitutional rights of minors range
from commonplace to significant. In United States v. Cuomo," a case
dealing primarily with federal juvenile legislation, the Fifth Circuit rejected the contention that the Sixth Amendment places stronger restraints
upon the federal government than the Fourteenth does upon the states and
requires a jury trial in federal juvenile-delinquency proceedings ° A second
case dealing with juvenile proceedings, Moss v. Weaver,5' held that a state
practice of imposing pretrial detention upon minors accused of delinquency violates the Fourth Amendment unless "probable cause" is created
by "facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the accused juvenile had committed the acts of delinquency." 5'
The court further held, on the other hand, that since the Fourth Amendment's standard of proof of "probable cause" is low, not even reaching the
"preponderance of evidence" level, the juvenile did not possess any constitutionally secured right to require the probable-cause determination to be
made on "competent, sworn testimony" with witnesses subject to crossexamination. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that a magistrate's decision whether to issue an arrest warrant even for adults is frequently based on hearsay and written testimony.
In Mahavongsanan v. Hall," the Fifth Circuit drew a sharp line between
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. U.S. 96 S. Ct. 3202, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1205 (1976).
49. 525 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1976).
50. This contention was an effort to avoid the Supreme Court's holding in McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), that a jury trial was not necessary in state juvenile
proceedings.
51. 525 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1976).
52. Id. at 1260, quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975).
53. 529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976).
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disciplinary actions and academic decisions in determining the authority
of courts to impose due-process requirements upon educational institutions. Mahavongsanan was a foreign graduate student who twice failed to
pass a comprehensive examination, which had become a degree requirement after her matriculation. She contended that, having met all of the
degree requirements which existed when she first matriculated, she was
entitled to her graduate degree. The plaintiff claimed that in denying her
the degree on the basis of a post-matriculation requirement, the university
officials had violated her due-process rights and breached her contract
with the institution. The Fifth Circuit disagreed. It said there is a "clear
dichotomy between a student's due process rights in disciplinary dismissals and in academic dismissals." The court rejected the breach-of-contract
claim on the ground that the rules and regulations of the university, with
which a student agrees to comply when he matriculates, are subject to any
modification that the university may in its discretion deem appropriate to
properly discharge its educational responsibilities.
The First-Amendment right of student editors to decide what shall appear in a student newspaper is apparently greater than that of the sponsoring university officials, who not infrequently are responsible for the disbursement of university funding necessary to maintain the publication.
The Fifth Circuit ruled in the 1973 case of Bazaarv. Fortune5 that University of Mississippi officials, could not interfere with the distribution of a
student magazine published "with the advice" of the English Department
of the University and fiscally protected with university funds. (The officials thought the language of the issue in question was too "earthy" for
university affiliated publication.) But in the 1976 decision of Mississippi
Gay Alliance v. Gaudelock" the court concluded that the First Amendment gave the student editor the right to determine what would or would
not be included in his publication and that, while university authorities
could not have ordered him to refrain from publishing an off-campus
homosexual group's advertisement in the university-sponsored and
university-funded student newspaper, the editor was protected by that
Amendment in his decision not to accept the advertisement.
Perhaps the most interesting contribution of the Fifth Circuit in the
developing area of the constitutional rights of minors is Ingraham v.
Wright.5 This litigation, filed in the Southern District of Florida in 1971,
is among the spate of recent "civil rights" actions which have attempted
to persuade federal courts that the teacher who spanks an unruly pupil in
the classroom is somehow launching an attack on the United States Con54. 476 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1973), modified, 489 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 995 (1974).
55. 536 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976).
56. 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 45 U.S.L.W. 4364 (U.S., April 19, 1977).
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stitution. 51 At issue was the administration of corporal punishment in the
Dade County, Florida, school system, the nation's sixth largest school
system, with approximately 12,500 teachers, 242,000 pupils and 237
schools. 58 The plaintiffs, who as a result of the corporal punishment had
received bruising of such severity that medical treatment was necessary,
filed not a tort action in the state courts but a federal civil-rights action
seeking compensatory and punitive damamges for an. alleged deprivation
of constitutionalrights and also seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
against the use of corporal punishment throughout the county school system." The constitutional provisions relied upon were the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments - "cruel and unusual punishment" and "due process" - with the plaintiffs contending that Dade County's corporalpunishment policies were constitutionally deficient both facially and as
applied.0° From the plaintiff's evidence, the district court found that, with
the exception of certain instances at one particular junior high school, the
severity of the "paddling" administered in the school system did not appear to be remarkable and dismissed the action under Rule 41(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'
On appeal, a majority of the three-judge panel conceded, with lamentations, that in light of the rather widespread use of corporal punishment in
public schools plus its repeated sanction by the courts, it would be difficult
to hold it to be on its face so repugnant to contemporary society that it
would fail to pass the "evolving standards of decency" test for an EighthAmendment violation.2 The panel nonetheless reversed the district court.
It did so on the theory that it was not, as the district court appeared to
have thought, necessary to the existence of an Eighth-Amendment violation that the applicationof corporal punishment be excessive throughout
the school system. The Amendment could be transgressed by misuse at
even a single school, the court said. In the opinion of two of the three judges
on the panel, the plaintiffs, whose evidence indicated that they had received physical injury of some severity at the school in question, had made
out a prima facie case of "excessive" punishment and hence of an Eighth57. See, e.g., Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D. N.C. 1975), aff'd, 423 U.S. 907
(1975); Bramlett v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1974); Ware v. Estes, 328 F. Supp. 657
(N.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 458 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027
(1972); Sims v. Waln, 388 F. Supp. 543 (S.D. Ohio 1974); Gonyaw v. Gray, 361 F. Supp. 366
(D. Vt. 1973); Glaser v. Marietta, 351 F. Supp. 555 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Whatley v. Pike County
Bd. of Educ., No. 977, (N.D. Ga. 1971) (three-judge court).
58. See Ingraham v. Wright, 498 F.2d 248, 253-254 (5th Cir. 1972).
59. Id. at 250, 255-259.
60. Id. at 259-261, 266-269.
61. Rule 41(b) authorizes a district court to dismiss actions upon motion in non-jury cases
when, upon completion of a plaintiff's evidence, it appears to the court that the plaintiff has
now shown that upon the facts and the law he has a right to judicial relief.
62. 498 F.2d at 260-261.
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Amendment violation. The two judges similarly concluded that while they
were unwilling, from a due-process viewpoint, to say that mild or moderate
corporal punishment was unrelated to the achievement of any legitimate
educational purpose, the harshness of the punishment actually administered at the junior high school was in "shocking disparity" to the offenses
and hence violated the Due Process Clause as well as the "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibition of Our Constitution. 3 Judge Morgan dissented on the ground that in a school system of 12,500 teachers, 242,000
pupils and 237 schools, a disciplinary event in one school could not give
rise to a constitutional question calling for federal judicial intervention."
This original panel decision was discussed in a previous Fifth Circuit
Survey, which, noting that a rehearing en banc had been granted, expressed the hope that Judge Morgan's dissent and not the original panel
decision would prevail. 5 This hope has now been fulfilled. Speaking this
time for a majority of the court en banc, Judge Morgan said that the
Eighth Amendment applied only to punishment invoked as a sanction of
criminal conduct and did not apply in a civil context such as the maintenance of school discipline." Saying that the proper remedy for excessive
or unreasonably severe corporal punishment was a civil or even criminal
action in the state courts for tortious conduct by the offending teacher, the
court en banc concluded: "We find it neither proper nor necessary to
expand the Eighth Amendment beyond its intended scope to encompass
an action which is essentially based on the commission of a battery." 7 The
court en banc also rejected the contention that there were violations of
substantive and procedural due process. Substantive due process was rejected on the ground that maintenance of discipline in the public schools
is a legitimate governmental end to which corporal punishment reasonably
relates; procedural due process was rejected on the ground that the notice
and hearing procedures insisted upon by plaintiffs (with right to counsel
and cross-examination of witnesses) were simply not appropriate to such
routine school disciplinary actions as keeping a disobedient child after
school or spanking him, since those disciplinary actions were not only not
serious enough to require the prerequisites of a formal hearing, but would
in fact dilute the value of corporal punishment for all concerned.
The dissenting judges in essence adhered to the views expressed by the
majority in the original panel decision: (1) the Eighth Amendment is not
limited in its scope to "a criminal setting" and school children have a
63. Id. at 269.
64. Id. at 271.
65. Evans, ConstitutionalLaw, 1974 Fifth Circuit Survey, 26 MER.L. Ray. 1153, 11761177 (1975).
66. Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 913-914 (5th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 45 U.S.L.W. 4364
(U.S. April 19, 1977).
67. 525 F.2d at 915.
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constitutional right to freedom from cruel and unusual punishment; (2)
arbitrary, excessive and severe corporal punishment is a denial of
substantive due process of law; and (3) the circumstances and severity of
the beatings were sufficiently serious to call for the protection of procedural
due process.
Conceptually, the dissent in Ingraham would on its face seem to have
much merit. Yet considering the forseeable consequences of the adoption
of the dissenters' position upon the use of corporal punishment as an effective tool for the maintenance of classroom discipline, one can only hope
that for the sake of public education practicality will continue to be given
precedence over mere conceptual symmetry of the law. The idea of a prespanking "hearing" with all of the procedural due process paraphernalia
which would attach if lawyers got into the act (with cross-examination and
so forth, as the Ingraham plaintiff asked for) seems in particular to rest
somewhere between silliness and insanity. More than 80 years ago, a
learned English jurist, upholding a headmaster's use of what may be the
earliest and best mode of "behavior modification," said: "The first observation that occurs to one to make is that one of the greatest advantages of
any punishment is that it should follow quickly on the offense. 6' 8 The
teacher who determines that classroom disruption, and its accompanying
interference with the rights of the twenty or thirty other pupils in the room
to an education, can most promptly and effectively be ended with a sharp
rap on the knuckles (or on some other portion of the unruly child's anatomy) needs to do the rapping now, not hours, days or weeks later.
SAfter the survey period ended, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth
Circuit's en banc decision and held that the Eighth Amendment does not
apply to school-children."
II.

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS:

"NUTS AND BOLTS" PLUS A STRAW IN THE WIND

Almost 25 years, not to mention reservoirs of ink, tons of paper, and legal
fees adequate to send a generation of lawyers' children through college,
have elapsed since the Supreme Court decided its "case of the century,"
70
Brown v. Board of Education.
Yet many of the questions about what
school officials must do, what they cannot do, and what they may do if they
choose to, in connection with race and public education, are still with us,
still unresolved.
This is not to say that the form that the bulk of the litigation takes has
not changed. It has. In place of the sweeping class actions of the middle
to late 1960's and early 1970's to desegregate entire school districts, current
68. Cleary v. Booth, 1 Q.B. 465, 467 (1893).
69. 45 U.S.L.W. 4364 (U.S., April 19, 1977).
70. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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litigation, with some very important exceptions, has to a large extent settled down to such "nuts and bolts" matters as whether an individual
teacher or pupil (or perhaps a small'number of either or both) has been
discriminated against on the basis of race or ethnic background. Thus,
most of the Fifth Circuit's 1976 decisions relate to such matters as whether
the ending of a particular teacher's employment was based upon race
rather than legitimate academic grounds, when the strict standards of
Singleton7 have to be applied to dismissals or demotions, and what constitutes a "demotion." In Adams v. Rankin County Board of Education," for
example, the court of appeals concluded that the evidence supported the
district court's finding that, as to three particular teachers who were not
reinstated along with others in the wake of staff reductions following implementation of a unitary school system, the basis of their particular dismissals had been incompetency, rather than race.
In Pickens v. Okolona Municipal Separate School District, 3 the plaintiff, a black teacher, claimed that the nonrenewal of his employment contract was impermissible because school authorities had used "nonobjective evaluative criteria" in making their decision. The Fifth Circuit,
however, said that the purpose of Singleton was not one to grant a black
teacher a job in perpetuity and that the case proscribed dismissals of black
teachers in the absence of previously published "objective" standards only
when the dismissal was in connection with a reduction in teaching staff
brought about by desegregation. The court of appeals agreed with the
district court that Singleton did not apply if, as in the case before it, the
evidence indicated that there was no overall reduction in the teaching staff
and that it was the plaintiff and not his position which had been terminated. The district court's decision that the termination had been based
not on the plaintiff's race but upon his substantial deficiencies as a teacher
was consequently affirmed.
Questions involving principals at all-black elementary schools who were
reassigned to positions of assistant principal at high or middle schools in
the course of a school system's conversion to a unitary system were presented to the court in a number of its 1976 cases. In Roper v. Effingham
County Board of Education,7" a high school assistant principal conceded
that his move from elementary principal to high school assistant principal
was not a "demotion," but alleged that the school board's failure to
promote him to the office of principal was racially discriminatory. The
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that the school
71.
banc).
72.
1976).
73.
74.

Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate School Dist.; 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1970) (en
524 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3057 (U.S., May 21,
527 F.2d 358 (5th Cir. 1976).
528 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1976).
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board's decision to promote others rather than the plaintiff to principalships was based upon the plaintiff's personal lack of merit and not upon
his race.
A similarly transferred plaintiff in Campbell v. Gadsden County District
School Board,75 however, achieved better .results by avoiding the mistake
of conceding that the reassignment from elementary principal to high
school assistant principal was not a demotion. The reassigned plaintiff,
although he had intia lly received a salary increase in connection with his
new position, submitted evidence to show that, as high school assistant
principal, he was no longer responsible for selecting and hiring faculty and
making teacher assignments, and that in general his new position was not
as prestigious as his former elementary school principalship. Observing
that Singleton defined "demotion" as a reassignment under which the staff
member (1) received less pay, or (2) had less responsibility, or (3) needed
less skill, the court of appeals concluded, as had the district court before
it, that the plaintiff had indeed been "demoted" within the meaning of
Singleton and that the strict standards of that case consequently were
applicable. The school board had failed to develop and publicize the written, objective, nonracial criteria required by Singleton in connection with
the "demotion" or "dismissal" of school personnel. The plaintiff had 30
years' exierience as a school administrator, in contrast to the far more
limited experience of the most recently employed white principals. The
order of the district court requiring that the plaintiff be placed in an
elementary school principalship was therefore affirmed. The plaintiff was
also awarded back pay and attorney fees.
The same Gadsden County School Board suffered another defeat in
virtually the same situation in United States v. Gadsden County School
7
District.
" This time it was the reassignment of a black former principal of
an elementary school to assistant principal of a middle school. Pointing out
that reassignment from principalship of a very small elementary school to
the higher-salaried position as assistant principal of a consi derably larger
middle (or high) school could still be a "demotion" when overall responsibilities and authority were reduced, the court of appeals reversed the district court's holding that the reassignment wasn't a demotion. It was the
Fifth Circuit's view that the evidence submitted by the former principal
concerning his reduced responsibilities as "assistant principal" (for example, loss of supervisory authority over teachers and curricula, lack of responsibility concerning school programs and finances) had in fact not been
contradicted by the school board's contention that he hadn't been demoted. The case once again demonstrates that in considering whether a
reassignment is a "demotion" that triggers application of the strict
75.
76.

534 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1976).
539 F.2d 1369 (5th Cir. 1976).
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Singleton standards, the mere fact of a higher salary is not controlling, and
the overall duties and responsibilities of a new position will also be considered.
Even such subjects as "busing" can be of the "nuts and bolts" variety
rather than part of a massive desegregation plan. Stout v. Jefferson County
Board of Education" was an appeal by the United States in connection
with the existence of two all-black schools and one all-white school in an
otherwise fully desegregated, 80% white school district. The United States
contended that the situation could be alleviated by busing students between the black schools and the essentially all white school facilities about
10 or 11 miles away. The fly in what would have seemed to be an easy-toapply ointment was a chain of small mountains between the black area and
the white area. It was traversed by but two roads. One, a major truck route,
produced more accidents than any similar stretch of road in the state. The
other, steep and winding, was also dangerous and carried a heavy volume
of automobile traffic. Under these circumstances, the Fifth Circuit agreed
with the district court that "busing" to eliminate the three remaining onerace schools need not be required. In its discussion of the situation, the
court of appeals also rather significantly noted that the existence of the two
all-black schools was the result of geography and demography alone rather
than the segregative act of any authority whatsoever, and that, under
Swann,7 8 the Constitution does not require racial quotas or balancing to
remedy racial or ethnic concentrations that are not imposed by government. In connection with the problem of "white flight," the court of appeals pointed out that while it was quite true that fear of this not infrequent phenomenon of school desegregation could not be accepted as a
reason for achieving anything less than the complete uprooting of the
racially segregated school system, it quite properly could be considered by
a court in connection with its weighing of alternative permissible desegregation plans.
The "straw in the wind" is not so much the Fifth Circuit's decision in
United States v. Texas Education Agency, 71 as it is the Supreme Court
order vacating the decision and remanding the case for reconsideration."
This case grew out of the use of a neighborhood assignment policy by the
Austin Independent School District (AISD) in view of the existing residential concentrations of Mexican-Americans in Austin. The district court had
held that while its past findings regarding intentional segregation of blacks
constituted a prima facie case of intentional segregation of MexicanAmericans, the AISD had successfully rebutted this prima facie case by
77.
78.
79.

537 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1976).
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
532 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1976).

80.

Sub. norm. Austin Ind. School Dist. v. United States,

50 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1976).

-

U.S.

__,

97 S. Ct. 517,
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showing that its past racial practices had not related to MexicanAmericans. This lack of "segregative intent" on the part of AISD toward
the Mexican-Americans obviated the necessity of "all-out desegregation"
of Mexican-Americans in Austin's schools, the district court said.
The Fifth Circuit essentially agreed with the district court that, under
Keyes,8 1 proof of "segregatory intent" was necessary to convert the factual
condition of ethnic concentrations in schools into a constitutional violation
calling for equitable relief. It also recognized that the cause-and-effect
test for "state action," which it had previously employed in such cases
as Austin P82 and Cisneros,s3 had been superseded by Keyes. The Fifth
Circuit nonetheless reversed the district court's conclusion that the evidence did not show this "intent." The basis of the reversal was the court's
incorporation into school segregation law of the ordinary rule of tort law
that "a person intends the natural and foreseeable consequences of his
actions." 8 On this basis, of course, the result was preordained. Since Austin, like most American cities, does indeed have ethnically concentrated
residential patterns, the "foreseeable consequence" of a neighborhood
school assignment policy is a reflection of the ethnic residential concentrations in the public schools.5 Having found "segregatory intent" by applying the customary "foreseeable consequences" rule of tort law, the court
of appeals proceeded to direct adoption of the sort of large-scale busing
remedy which the Supreme Court had approved in Swann. Under a proposed plan whose general format the court agreed with, somewhere between 32% and 42% of Austin's students would have had to have been
"bused.""8
AISD filed its petition for certiorari on August 11, 1976. It asked the
Supreme Court to review the questions: (1) whether the Fifth Circuit had
erred in holding that school districts are constitutionally prohibited from
using a neighborhood school assignment policy when ethnically concentrated residential areas exist, even if the policy is shown to have been
adopted for non-discriminatory educational purposes, and (2) whether extensive busing would be a proper remedy in the face of the district court
finding - not held by the court of appeals to be clearly erroneous - of
81. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
82. United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1972).
83. Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Indep. School Dist., 467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973).
84. 532 F.2d at 388. The court recognized the need to conform Austin I and Cisneros to
Keyes. In analyzing Austin I, the court concluded that this could -be done by interpreting the
earlier cases as having inferentially incorporated the ordinary rule of tort law concerning
"foreseeable consequences" and thus meeting the Keyes requirement of "segregative intent."
85. The court of appeals also expressed its opinion that "refusal of school authorities to
take affirmative action that would desegregate the school system may be probative of the
segregative intent underlying various actions by those officials." 532 F.2d at 389.
86. 532 F.2d at 395 n. 22.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

adverse consequences for the health, safety and education of the children. 7
In December, 1976, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the
Fifth Circuit and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of
5
Washington v. Davis."
It is difficult to construe this as anything other than
a rejection of Fifth Circuit's view that the "segregatory intent" necessary
to authorize judicial relief in a school segregation case can be shown solely
through the "foreseeable consequences" rule of tort law. In Washington v.
Davis black plaintiffs seeking to become police officers in Washington,
D.C., contended that certain written tests for "verbal skills," which they
had failed to pass, were unrelated to job performance and in fact intended
to exclude black applicants. The Supreme Court flatly rejected the notion
that the racial "impact" of the tests (manifestly a "foreseeable consequence" of their usage) was adequate to condemn their use as a matter of
constitutional law. "[Olur cases have not embraced the proposition that
a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially
discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially
disproportionate impact," the Court said."' The Court also referred specifically to school desegregation when it observed:
The school desegregation cases have also adhered to the basic equal protection principle that the invidious quality of law claimed to be racially
discriminatory must alternately be traced to a racially discriminatory
purpose. That there are both predominantly black and predominantly
white schools in a community is not alone violative of the Equal Protection Clause. The essential element of de jure segregation is "a current
condition of segregation resulting from intentional state action. . . . The
differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto
segregation. . . is purpose or intent to segregate.""
In the Supreme Court's remand of the Austin decision itself, a concurring opinion of Justice Powell, joined in by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, may be significant. After expressing his view that the Fifth
Circuit had perhaps erred in its readiness to impute to school officials a
segregative intent "far more pervasive than the evidence justified,",' Justice Powell said he thought the court had further erred by ordering a
desegregation plan far exceeding that which might conceivably be necessary to eliminate the effect of any official acts or omissions. After pointing
out that the principal cause of racial and ethnic imbalance in urban public
schools across the country was imbalance in residential patterns, which is
87. 45 U.S.L.W. 3172 (U.S., Aug. 31, 1976).
88. Sub nom. Austin Indep. School Dist. v. United States, U.S. -, 97 S. Ct. 517,
50 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1976). The case of Washington v. Davis, upon which the vacating of the
judgment was predicated, is reported at 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
89. 426 U.S. at 239.
90. Id. at 240.
91. 97 S. Ct. at 517, 50 L. Ed. 2d at 603-604.
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typically beyond the control of school authorities, Justice Powell continued:
[Tihe limitation repeatedly expressed by this Court [is] that the extent
of an equitable remedy is determined by and may not properly exceed the
effect of the constitutional violation. Thus, large scale busing is permissible only where the evidence supports a finding that the extent of integration sought to be achieved would have existed had the school authorities fulfilled their constitutional obligations in the past. Such a standard
is remedial rather than punitive, and would rarely result in the widespread
busing of elementary age children. A remedy simply is not equitable if it
is disproportionate to the wrong.12
In Keyes Justice Powell had been rather critical of such cases as Swann
precisely because the remedies approved had required school districts to
eliminate conditions of racial concentrations or imbalance in the schools
to an extent which went far beyond the degree of racial separation or
imbalance which could reasonably be attributed to state action rather than
to normal ethnic concentrations brought about by choice, economic pressures and various other factors over which government (at least in a free
society) has no control." Justice Powell's view in Keyes has now been
joined in by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist in the Austin case.
If it represents, or comes to represent, the prevailing view of the Court, the
"winds of change" will indeed be blowing in a different direction - a
direction which may make school bus manufacturers unhappy but which
certainly will cheer those who want to avoid wasteful consumption of our
energy resources (oil and gasoline) and probably will delight most parents,
black and white.

III.

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN DISCRETIONARY POLITICAL APPOINTMENTS

Current instances of judicial reluctance to act when it appears that
public officials may have acted in a racially discriminatory manner are
unquestionably few and far between. One of these sparse preserves upon
which the courts have refused to poach is the discretionary politicalappointment power of elected executive officers. In James v. Wallace," the
plaintiffs attempted to end alleged. racial discrimination by the Governor
of Alabama in his appointment, of persons to virtually all state boards and
commissions. The plaintiffs presented what in most other racial discrimination cases would have been overwhelming statistical evidence. In a state
in which the general citizenry is about 28% black, the Governor, out of
92.

97 S. Ct. at 519, 50 L. Ed. 2d at 605. See also Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 720, 738,

744 (1974).
93. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 217-254 (1973) (concurring opinion of
Justice Powell).
94. 533 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1976).
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1,556 political appointments, had named only 8 blacks (about one-half of
one percent of all appointments). Yet the Fifth Circuit held that the statistical evidence was not enough to establish a prima facie case. The court
conceded that its assessment was "influenced" by the fact that the alleged
discrimination related neither to employment in general nor to governmental functions which were devoid of political or policy-making content, but
related instead to the exercise of a "discretionary power" vested by state
law in its chief executive officer.
While the decision may seem incongruous when viewed in connection
with the Fifth Circuit's steadfast efforts to end the slightest tinges of racial
discrimination in virtually all other areas of governmental activity, the
result in James v. Wallace would nonetheless seem compelled by the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene
5
County"
and Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League."
Both of these cases noted the serious problems which would be presented
were a federal court to attempt to interfere with the discretionary appointment power of an elected executive officer. In each case the Supreme Court
declined to wrestle with the bear. It decided each case instead upon the
premise that the "evidence" presented- in the context of what the case
involved - exercise of discretionary appointment powers by an elected
executive official - was insufficient to make out a case for the aggrieved
plaintiffs. It is unlikely that the point was lost on the Fifth Circuit that in
the Greene County case, the Supreme Court's "want of evidence" adjudication was in the face of evidence showing a flat zero appointment rate for
blacks to the jury commission in a county which was 75% black. Obviously
the burden of proof which a plaintiff will have to bear if he is ever to get
an adjudication on the merits of the underlying issue is considerable.
IV.

RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION IN PRIVATE CLUBS:

STATE ACTION AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

It is clear that the membership policies of a genuinely private club are
not of federal constitutional concern. This is so notwithstanding the fact
that it may receive state-furnished services such as electricity, water, police and fire protection, or the fact that it may be subject to some state
regulation and licensing, such as a permit to serve alcoholic beverages. 7 It
is equally clear, on the other hand, that it is possible for the state to be so
"significantly" involved in private conduct that it becomes in effect a
95. 396 U.S. 320 (1970).
96. 415 U.S. 605 (1974).
97. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972). The Court pointed out that a
contrary holding "would utterly emasculate the distinction between private as distinguished
from state conduct" to which it had adhered ever since The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3

(1883).
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partner or even a joint venturer. When the state is that involved, the
otherwise "private" conduct can be reached by the Fourteenth Amendment.99 The difficulty in any case is to determine, "by sifting facts and
weighing circumstances," 9 how much involvement by the state is enough
to be "significant."
This was the problem which faced the Fifth Circuit in Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club.'" The yacht club, which predated the City of
Miami, commenced leasing bay bottom land under its dock facilities from
the city at one dollar per year after Miami asserted title to the bottom land
in 1962.'1 It was this "involvement" of government which the plaintiffs
thought was sufficient to bring the club's racially and religiously discriminatory membership policies into conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment.
The district court concluded that while the Biscayne Bay Yacht Club was
a genuinely private club, performing no public function and receiving no
public funds, the dollar-a-year lease of the bay bottom land from the city
was sufficient official involvement with the club's discriminatory membership policies to cause the policies to run afoul of Fourteenth Amendment
and "civil rights" shoals. This was affirmed by a panel of the Fifth Circuit,
Judge Coleman dissenting. 02 Upon rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit,
with five dissents, reversed. It held that this very limited official involvement
[als a matter of law and race . . .fall[s] short of establishing that the
City of Miami has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the club that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the
internal membership policies of the club. The City of Miami has not
significantly involved itself in those membership policies. The lease does
not provide a sufficiently close nexus between the city and the club so that
the action of the club may be fairly treated as that of the city.'
The Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 4, 1976, with Justices
Brennan and Marshall announcing that they would have granted the
writ. 10

V.

TITLE

VII: A

CONTEMPORARY HORROR STORY

One might think that elementary fairness would require that, before one
98. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
99. 407 U.S. at 172.
U.S. -, S. Ct. 186, 50 L. Ed. 2d
100. 530 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, -

152 (1976).
101. Miami's claim of title to the bay bottom was not litigated, the matter being instead
resolved by the lease.
102.
103.
104.
(1976).

Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 521 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1975).
530 F.2d at 22.
, 97 S. Ct. 186, 50 L. Ed. 2d 152
U.S. Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, __
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can be punished - indeed punished quite severely' 5 - for having discriminated upon such impermissible grounds as race, religion, sex and the like
in his employment of others, it ought to be shown that he knowingly and
purposefully discriminated on one of those grounds. Certainly this is the
0
the Supreme Court
constitutional standard. In Washington v. Davis,'1
flatly rejected the notion that employment standards or tests which were
on their face non-discriminatory and not shown to have been used for
purposes of discrimination, could nonetheless be constitutionally objectionable simply because their application was shown to have had a greater
"impact" upon one racial or ethnic group than it did on another.
The world of Title VII' s7 is something else, and current decisions in the
area are best not read on a full stomach or at bedtime. In Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.,' 0 8 the Supreme Court held that Title VII could be violated by
employment practices which tended to exclude more blacks than whites
even if the practices were neutral on their face and even if discriminatory
intent on the part of the employer was absent. Since that case, in which
the possession of a high school diploma or the passing of a standardized
general intelligence test was the condition of employment that was successfully attacked, it has been strictly downhill from the viewpoint of
attempting to maintain quality standards for personnel. The Supreme
Court did give lip service in Griggs to the proposition that the Congress
had not commanded that the less qualified be preferred over the more
qualified because of minority origins and that Congress had not precluded
the use of tests or similar employment standards,'"' but the Court pointed
out that if an employer does utilize such tests or quality standards as a
condition of employment, promotion or like opportunities, he bears the
burden of proving that the requirement has a "manifest relationship to the
employment in question."' 01 The Court further made it quite clear that the
sort of "relationship to job performance" it had in mind was not merely
some loose connection, but was justification by a showing of "business
necessity." As the Court put it:
The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that
are fair in form but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Ne105. In United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 835 (5th Cir. 1975),
the settlement order included payment of $30,940,000. It would be logical to assume that one
way or another, these huge corporate losses are ultimately borne by the ultimate citizenconsumer of the corporation's products or services (i.e., all of us) through higher prices in the
market place.
106. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). See the text accompanying notes 89 and 90, supra, for a discussion of this case.
107. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253 (1964), 42 U.SC.A. §2000e (1974).
108. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
109. Id. at 436.
110. Id. at 432.
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groes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is
prohibited.
On the record before us, neither the high school completion requirement
nor the general intelligence test is shown to bear a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which it was used. Both were
adopted . . . without meaningful study of their relationship to job performance. Rather a vice president of the Company testified, the requirements were instituted on the Company's judgment that they generally
would improve the overall quality of the work force.I
The heavy burden which faces the employer seeking to validate tests or
qualify standards was subsequently enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody."' Following EEOC guidelines, the Court
indicated that testing or the imposition of like quality standards was impermissible unless shown "by professionally acceptable methods" to be
"predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of work
behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being evaluated.""'
Thus, it comes as no surprise that testing for purposes of employment
or promotion did not fare well in the Fifth Circuit during 1976. In Watkins
v. Scott Paper Co.,"' the court of appeals reversed the district court's
finding that a prerequisite of a high school education was justified because
new and more sophisticated equipment was coming into use. In the words
of the court of appeals:
If Scott wishes to validate any barrier to the advancement of affected class
members to their rightful places, it has the burden of showing business
necessity. Then, even assuming that non-high school graduates do not
perform as well as high school graduates, the question should be whether
non-high school graduates perform adequately. For only if the diplomaless
individual is not adequate to a job may his exclusion from that job be
deemed a business necessity. Next, the fact that lack of a diploma may
be a "serious obstacle" to an individual learning a job. . . does not show
that the diploma is a business necessity." 5
The sort of showing which an employer must make if he is daring (or
111. Id. at 431 (emphasis added). One may well ponder about the status of our "freeenterprise" system when a businessman, without so much as a suggestion of any intent to
discriminate for ethnic, religious, sexual or other forbidden reasons, can get himself and his
company into such deep trouble with government for attempting to "improve the overall
quality of the work force."
112. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
113. Id. at 431, citing 29 C.F.R. §1607.4(c) (1976). The typical businessman might well
say that while he doesn't understand the "fine print" of this rather wretched example of
bureaucratic mumbo-jumbo, he does get the "message" which is: Don't use testing procedures or similar quality control standards.
114. 530 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1976).
115. Id. at 1180-1181 (emphasis in original).
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foolhardy) enough to persist in the use of tests or similar quality standards
in the attempt to obtain a superiorrather than merely adequate work force
is also seen in the court's commentary upon what it means by the requirement that the tests or standards be justified by "business necessity." According to the court, "business necessity" means more than a showing that
the test, standard or practice serves legitimate management functions;
necessity connotes an "irresistible demand" and must not only foster
safety and efficiency of a plant, but must be essential to those goals."' 6
Needless to say, in light of these standards, Scott Paper Company's aptitude tests were found wanting, although the tests were remanded for further validation study rather than stricken outright.
In Robinson v. Union Carbide Corp.," 7 the court reviewed both hiring
and promotional practices. While the company's hiring practices were approved because of evidence that its overall employee racial breakdown was
approximately the same as that of the work force in the surrounding area,
the company did not pass the Fifth Circuit's review of its promotion policies. Noting that the percentage of blacks in supervisory or salaried positions was considerably lower than the overall percentage of black employees, the court of appeals concluded that plaintiffs had made out a prima
facie case. The burden of persuasion thus was shifted to Union Carbide,
which had to show that the statistical discrepancy resulted from causes
other than racial discrimination. The company's attempt to make such a
showing was found inadequate by the court. In connection with the promotion of hourly wage employees, which was based upon seniority plus successful completion of comprehensive tests designed and administered by
the employer, the court found that Union Carbide had failed to show that
there was a correlation between test scores and actual job performance.
With respect to the promotions to supervisory positions, the company did
not use testing procedures that were so difficult to sustain, but instead
relied upon evaluations by top management officials, who considered such
things as "adaptability," "bearing," "demeanor," "maturity," "drive"
and "social behavior." Instead of applauding this seemingly quite rational
approach to the selection of supervisory personnel, the court of appeals was
agitated by the fact that it was a "subjective" evaluation. "Such high-level
subjectivity subjects the ultimate promotion decision to the- intolerable
occurrence of conscious or unconscious prejudice," the court said."'
116. Id. at 1168.
117. 538 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1976).
118. Id. at 662. One might well ask whether what really is "intolerable" about the situation is the court's telling top management not to make precisely the sort of "subjective"
opinions which top management is required to make if it is performing its customary and
proper function of evaluating persons for supervisory and managerial advancement. The
thought crosses one's mind about how much fun it would be to cross-examine the judges about
the criteria they use in selecting their law clerks.
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When the Supreme Court rejected the use of Title VII standards to
determine whether employment tests are constitutionally objectionable
when shown to have an impact greater upon one race than another, and
instead approved the use of reasonable tests whatever their "impact" as
long as no racially discriminatory purpose is shown, Justice Brennan, dissenting, expressed the following concern: "Today's result will prove particularly unfortunate if it is extended to govern Title VII cases."", One can
only hope that Justice Brennan's expressed fear will one day come to
fruition.
VI.

BANKRUPTCY IS A "CIVIL RIGHT"

After a discussion of Title VII and the severe obstacles it presents to the
businessman who desires to have something more than an "adequate"
work force, it is fitting to point out that some consolation does exist for the
businessman who finds his back to the wall as a result of too many merely
"adequate" employees. The case of McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light
Co. 110 advises him that "bankruptcy" is a "civil right."
This case was brought by an employee against both his employer and
his union. The employee contended that the defendants had conspired to
deprive him of his civil right to avail himself of the federal bankruptcy
laws. He had been discharged by his employer, a public utility, on the
ground that he had violated company policy by filing a voluntary petition
in bankruptcy. The court of appeals concluded that while his complaint
did not state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.A. §1983 because there was
no "state action," it did under the conspiracy provisions of 42 U.S.C.A.
§1985(3).
VII.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEES

The fact that one has a "constitutional" right to say something doesn't
mean that he cannot be evaluated or judged upon the content of his
speech.'' To put it another way, the fact that a public employee may have
a constitutional right to make irresponsible or foolish statements doesn't
necessarily mean that his administrative superiors are constitutionally
prohibited from evaluating that employee as irresponsible or foolish, even
to the point of dismissing him from his employment, if these defects go to
his competency to carry out his responsibilities in a satisfactory manner.
119. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 270 (1976) (dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan).
120. 526 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1976).
121. This point was made - concededly on the basis of a paucity of decisions on the
matter - in a detailed discussion of the relationship between the First Amendment and
public employees in a 1974 survey article. See Evans, ConstitutionalLaw, 1974 Fifth Circuit
Survey, 26 MER. L. REV. 1153 (1975).
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The Fifth Circuit appears to have recognized this principle in Megill v.
Board of Regents.2 Five of the six reasons relied upon by the Board of
Regents for terminating a university professor's employment related to
some form of "speech." 1n The Fifth Circuit concluded, however, that the
plaintiff had not had any of his First Amendment rights violated. As to
speech which was clearly public - a "press conference" - and hence on
its face presumably "protected" despite the court's contrary dicta,"4 the
Fifth Circuit said: "The Board found such remarks evidenced Megill's
tendency to make untrue and misleading public statements. It was this
and not the fact that Dr. Megill made public statements that guided the
Board.' ' 25 The Court went on to make the following observations concerning other "speech" on the part of Dr. Megill which led to his dismissal:
This conduct can appropriately be used by the Board to evaluate the
competency of a teacher without violating any First Amendment right.
Out of necessity, an academic board, in deciding whether or not to grant
tenure, must consider an instructor's communications both in the classroom and outside.'"
In a more typical "balancing" case, Abbott v. Thetford,1 7 the Fifth
Circuit held that the chief probation officer's "right to file a lawsuit" - a
lawsuit which he had brought on behalf of three dependent and neglected
black children to integrate public all-white child care institutions - was
protected by the First Amendment and, in the circumstances, outweighed
a juvenile court judge's oral directive to members of his staff (including
all probation personnel) not to file lawsuits without his knowledge and
approval. As is so often the case in First-Amendment "balancing," the
result is apt to depend upon who assigns the "weights" to the factors tossed
upon the scales. A vigorous dissenting opinion thought that the interests
of a state court judge in controlling his own court and its staff should have
outweighed the staff member's disobedience. 8
The big news in the area of the First Amendment and public employees,
however, occurred at a higher level. In Mt. Healthy City School District
122.
123.

541 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 1081.

124. While the court at several points seems to take the view that "none of the speechrelated activity of Dr. Megill was constitutionally protected," Id. at 1082, this is faulty
analysis, as is indeed shown by the fact that elsewhere in the same opinion the Fifth Circuit
is critical of the district court's failure to engage in the typical First-Amendment "balancing
process" respecting the competing interests of the public employee and his employer. Id. at

1081. Obviously if the speech in question is not "protected," there is no need for any
"balancing."
125. Id. at 1083.
126.
127.

Id. at 1084, 1085.
529 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1976).

128.

Id. at 702-709 (dissenting opinion of Judge Gewin.)
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Board of Education v. Doyle,' the Supreme Court rejected the view that
if a public employee is fired partially because of constitutionally protected
activities, the dismissal is totally defective and the employee is entitled to
reinstatement.'3 The district had concluded that a non-permissible reason, the exercise of "free speech" rights, had played "a substantialpart"
in the decision not to renew the teacher's contract, and hence "even in the
face of other permissible grounds - the decision may not stand."'"' The
district court thereupon ordered the teacher's reinstatement with back
1 3
pay, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Vacating the district court's judgment and remanding for further proceedings, the Supreme Court explained:
We are thus brought to the issue whether, even if the board would have
reached the same decision regarding plaintiff's employment on other
grounds], the fact that the protected conduct played a "substantial part"
in the actual decision not to renew would necessarily amount to a constitutional violation justifying remedial action. We think that it would not.
A rule of causation which focuses solely on whether protected conduct
played a part, "substantial" or otheiwise in a decision not to rehire, could
place an employee in a better position as a result of the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct than he would have occupied had he done
nothing.
. . .The constitutional principle at stake is vindicated if such an employee is placed in no worse a position than if he had not engaged in the
conduct.1'"
The "principle at stake," of course, is that equitable relief is remedial, not
punitive, and ought not to go beyond placing the plaintiff in the same
position he would have occupied if it had not been for the defendant's
wrongful conduct.
VIII.

CONFLICT BETWEEN "RELIGIOUS BELIEF" AND "AGENCY SHOP"

With the general proliferation of all manner of federally enforceable legal
rights for everyone, it is not surprising that such rights will sometimes
come into conflict. In Cooper v. General Dynamics, 4 the plaintiffs, Seventh Day Adventists, had objected to the provisions of a collectivebargaining agreement between the company and the union, which pro129. __
U.S.-,
97 S. Ct. 568, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1977).
130. This view seems to have prevailed in the Fifth Circuit as well as elsewhere. See Megill
v. Board of Regents, 541 F.2d 1073, 1081 (5th Cir. 1976); Fluker v. Alabama State Bd. of
Educ., 441 F.2d 201, 210 (5th Cir. 1971).
131. __
U.S.
-, 97 S. Ct. at 574, 50 L. Ed. 2d at 482.
132. Doyle v. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 529 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1975).
133. 97 S. Ct. at 575, 50 L. Ed. 2d at 482-483.
134. 533 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1976).
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vided for an "agency shop." It was their position that either joining or
financially supporting a labor union was sinful, because the "neighbor"
whom one is commanded to love includes one's employer, and that by
supporting the union they would be placing their souls in jeopardy. The
legal foundation of the plaintiff's case was Title VII's prohibition against
depriving persons of employment opportunities because of their religion,'
coupled with EEOC guidelines calling upon employers to accommodate
employee's religious needs if this could be done without undue hardship
to the business operation.' The defense, not surprisingly, was the National Labor Relations Act's recognition of the propriety of "agency shop"
provisions to further legitimate labor-union interests (in the absence of
contrary state "right to work" laws). 3 The temporary solution of the Fifth
Circuit was to reverse the district court's decision in favor of the defendants - a decision which had apparently been based in part upon the
district court's rejection of the plaintiffs religious belief, however sincerely
held, as being irrational and specious' - with direction to the lower court
to conduct further proceedings to ascertain whether the plaintiffs' religious
beliefs could reasonably be accommodated by the employer and the union
without undue hardship to the conduct of the employer's business or to the
union.
IX.

SECTION 1983 LIABILITY OF A

SUPERVISOR

While the doctrine of respondeat superior ordinarily has no application
to civil-rights actions,"' a supervisor may be within the reach of 42
U.S.C.A. §1983 even though his "personal participation" is not shown. In
Sims v. Adams,'40 the Fifth Circuit held that while §1983 does require a
degree of causation as an element of individual liability, the plaintiff had
stated a claim when he alleged that the supervisory defendants - the
Mayor, the Chief of Police, and police committee members of the Board
of Aldermen of Atlanta - knew or should have known of a particular police
officer's prior violent misconduct against black citizens. Complaints
against the officer were pending, and the defendants had failed to discipline him. The court's rationale was that a supervisor's breach of duty
imposed by state or local law through improper performance of training
and supervisory duties could cause a plaintiff's constitutional injury and
subject the supervisor to §1983 liability even in the absence of "personal
participation."
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

42 U.S.C.A. §2000e-2 (1974).
29 C.F.R. §1605.1(c) (1976).
29 U.S.C.A. §158 (1970).
1533 F.2d at 166 n.4.
E.g., Lathon v. Parish of Jefferson, 358 F. Supp. 558, 559 (E.D. La. 1973).
537 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1976).
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THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT VS. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment and the principle of sovereign immunity it embodies are
subject to the limitation of the enforcement provisions of §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which gives Congress the authority to enforce the
Amendment "by appropriate Legislation." Encouraged, no doubt, by that
decision, the plaintiffs in Jagnandanv. Giles,"2 sought reimbursement of
tuition fees which the district court found they had unconstitutionally
been required to pay.4 3 The plaintiffs contended that the Eleventh
Amendment, adopted in 1798, must give way to the Fourteenth, adopted
70 years later, and to its protection of the individual's right not to have
his due-process and equal-protection rights trespassed upon by the states.
Noting that no congressional "enforcing legislation" of the Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer sort was present in the case before it, the court of appeals rejected
the plaintiffs' argument."' The court held in effect that until the Supreme
Court holds that the Eleventh Amendment was modified by the Fourteenth to fully effectuate the sweeping mandate of the latter, it was bound
by what the Supreme Court had said in Edelman v. Jordan,"' and the
latter amendment did not constitute a pro tanto repeal of the former.
141. U.S. __,
96 S. Ct. 2666, 49 L. Ed. 2d 614 (1976).
142. 538 F.2d 1666 (5th Cir. 1976).
143. The plaintiffs were alien students who, while bona fide residents of Mississippi, were
nonetheless classified as non-residents for tuition and fee purposes. The district court con-

cluded that the state statute mandating this result was violative of the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
144. 538 F.2d at 1182.
145. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).

